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THE TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS OF THE FIRST
ELECTRONIC MONITORING AGREEMENT IN US
FOR ZAPPERS, PHANTOMWARE, AND OTHER SALES SUPPRESSION DEVICES
Richard T. Ainsworth
Robert J Chicoine
On August 30, 2017, a plea was entered in the case of case of State of Washington v.
Wong, Wash. Super. Ct., No. 16-1-00179-0, and as a result the first electronic monitoring
agreement of sales transactions in the US (the “Monitoring Agreement”) was legislatively
imposed on a retail business.
The Monitoring Agreement was negotiated between the State of Washington Department
of Revenue (the “WA DOR”) and the taxpayer over a period of several months and is comprised
of two parts: the basic agreement, which covered the obligations and rights of the parties, and an
appendix, which defines the scope of sales information to be monitored, and the technological
means by which that information is gathered, secured from manipulation, and transmitted
electronically to the DOR.
This paper focuses upon the technology requirements in this first-of-its-kind electronic
monitoring agreement between a revenue authority and a taxpayer in the US. The basic
agreement, which not only delineates the specific obligations of the taxpayer to provide the WA
DOR with real time access to retail sales information, but also sets out various protections for the
taxpayer, such as limitations on possible allegations of breach, rights to cure, and administrative
adjudication of material disputes, all designed to protect the taxpayers right to continue in
business, will be discussed in a separate follow-up article.
The problem this agreement seeks to address is sales suppression at the point of sale
(POS). Not traditional sales suppression, or skimming with double tills, but sophisticated
technology-assisted skimming. The specific targets are programs known as Zappers and
Phantomware, which are used with POS systems or electronic cash registers (ECRs) to
manipulate sales figures. Once installed, an electronic monitoring system will solve other types
of suppression, like internal theft, open till, misuse of legitimate functions such as training mode,
or voided transactions, but those frauds are not its immediate target.
Electronic monitoring of retail sales by taxing authorities is not unusual outside of the
US. It has been used for decades to counteract Zappers and Phantomware, but never before has
it been used in the US. 1
Perhaps the best analogy to electronic monitoring of sales is the use of video cameras
installed by businesses to monitor inventory theft. Electronic monitoring of POS systems or
ECRs is simply using technology to watch in real-time for indications of suppression or

1

Richard T. Ainsworth & Urs Hengartner, Quebec’s Sales Recording Module (SRM): Fighting the Zapper,
Phantomware, and Tax Fraud with Technology, 57 CANADIAN TAX JOURNAL 715 (2009)(discussing antisuppression systems in Quebec, Sweden, Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Belgium, Germany and Italy among others).
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manipulation of the sales data that allows the sales tax paid by customers to go unreported by the
shop owner.
ONLY IN WASHINGTON 2
Twenty-five states have laws expressly prohibiting electronic sales suppression such as
Zappers, Phantomware, and other suppression devices. 3 In Wong (the “Taxpayer”), the WA
DOR prosecuted the use of a Profitek Zapper. 4 Other investigations continue to occur in
Washington for suspected use of Zappers and Phantomware.
Financial penalties and criminal sanctions, including incarceration, are the punishments
meted out in each of the twenty-five states. Washington’s anti sales suppression statute is unique
in two important respects: 1) it prohibits engaging in future business activity after conviction,
and 2) a taxpayer is compelled to find an electronic monitoring solution which must be
“acceptable to the department.”
There is a three-part exception to the business prohibition provision, one part of which
requires the Taxpayer to pay the tax liability “lawfully due” and another requires the installation
of an electronic monitoring “acceptable to the department”. The Washington statute provides:
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of violating this section to
engage in business, or participate in any business as an owner, officer, director,
partner, trustee, member, or manager of the business, unless:
(i) All taxes, penalties, and interest lawfully due are paid;
(ii) The person pays in full all penalties and fines imposed on the person for
violating this section; and
(iii) The person, if the person is engaging in business subject to tax under
this title, or the business in which the person participates, enters into a
written agreement with the department for the electronic monitoring of the
business's sales, by a method acceptable to the department, for five years at
the business's expense. 5
Aside from the uncertainty of trying to timely satisfy requirements determined, in large
part, by the discretion of the WA DOR i.e. the amount of tax legally due, the monitoring method
acceptable to the WA DOR, and the terms of an agreement which the WA DOR will actually
accept, practical technologic issues render the requirements of this provision far more difficult
than they may first appear. 6
2

Details of this case in the context of the Washington statute are considered in Richard T. Ainsworth & Robert J.
Chicoine, Zappers, Phantomware and Other Sales Suppression Software in the State of Washington, STATE TAX
NOTES (forthcoming).
3
A Zapper places sales suppression programming on a removable CD or memory stick, whereas Phantomware is
suppression programming installed on a ECR/POS system. Their function is the same.
4
For a discussion of the Profitek Zapper see: Richard T. Ainsworth, Sales Suppression: The International
Dimension, 65 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1241 (2016).
5
RCW 82.32.290(4)(b)
6
The authors perceive a number of legal challenges to Washington’s sales suppression statute, which are beyond the
scope of this article.
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There are two major hurdles: (a) the security provider should be independent of all point
of sale equipment providers (the POS manufacturer, ECR manufacturer, printer manufacturer, or
any distributors, or installers of this equipment), and (b) the third-party security provider needs to
secure the permission of a POS/ECR manufacturer to integrate with the POS/ECR software,
which will likely not occur.
Both of these difficulties have the same source. Almost all Zappers, Phantomware and
other suppression devices are manufactured, sold, or provided to retailers by a member of the
equipment-provider supply chain. It is rare today to find the manufacturer of a POS system
directly producing and selling suppression software. It is far more common to find systems that
are “open” to software “enhancements” of many kinds, and the real manufacturer of the Zapper
or other device is the distributor, salesman, or system installer who has an interest in maximizing
sales of the manufacturer’s units to customers who are seeking suppression capabilities. This is
simply how this marketplace works, and how these supply chains sell their product.
The involvement of the equipment supply chain in spreading technology-based sales
suppression is common knowledge and can be documented globally. In the U.S., the clearest
example is illustrated in New York where the Department of Taxation and Finance conducted a
series of undercover sting operations. 95% of the sales people showing up to provide new
ECR/POS systems to the undercover agents who were posing as restaurateurs offered
suppression technology to help sell their equipment. 7
Unlike Washington, which shifts the burden of finding a solution to the Taxpayer, all
other jurisdictions that mandate electronic monitoring list on their web sites the “acceptable
solutions.” These jurisdictions compel ECR/POS equipment providers operating within their
jurisdiction to cooperate with and allow the integration of the third-party security solutions.
Take for example Quebec. 8 Revenue Quebec posts the name and model number of all
acceptable ECRs and POS systems.
See: http://www.revenuquebec.ca/en/entreprises/obligationsparticulieres/restauration/systemes/d
efault.aspx
With no regulations specifying what is and is not “acceptable,” the Washington taxpayer
must find, propose, and negotiate an acceptable solution, or go to the expense of challenging the
statute and risk the right to continue business operations. Given that the international standard
involves finding a third-party security provider who can integrate with an unrelated provider of
ECR/POS equipment, the challenge is considerable.
7

For a discussion of the sting operations see: Richard T. Ainsworth, Sales Suppression as a Service, and the Apple
Store Solution, 73 STATE TAX NOTES 343 (August 4, 2014).
8
There is no easy way to say this, but when it comes to anti-sales suppression technology the State of Washington
should not be so far behind Quebec. Washington should at least be comparable. In Quebec, it is possible to visit
any local cash register supplier to purchase a fully compliant POS. It does need to be registered and activated by the
Quebec Revenue, but there is not much more to it for the taxpayer.
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In the US context, we need to keep in mind the reality shown from the New York stings.
This is a measure of the market. To stay in business a Washington taxpayer who is convicted
under the statute is required to secure an arrangement with ECR/POS equipment providers that
runs against established business practices. The practice is that manufacturers tend to make
equipment that can be manipulated, and distribute it through salesmen and installers who are
inclined to increase sales by finding add-on technology that will perform the data manipulations
demanded by an owner. This gives the Taxpayer, who is searching for anti-suppression
technology, a difficult problem. He needs to negotiate permission for a third-party security
company to access and integrate with the manufacturer’s ECR/POS system.
Getting access to proprietary systems is difficult, particularly a small restaurant.
Although it may not be as difficult for a multi-location restaurant chain that can hold out the
promise of purchasing many systems in exchange for cooperation on security features.
Because we were successful in negotiating agreements with both ECR/POS providers and
third-party security providers, as well as the Washington State Department of Revenue and the
Attorney General, the taxpayer and the defense team believe that it is in the interest of the
community to publish the technology requirements within our Electronic Monitoring Agreement,
and to provide an explanation of its provisions.
We have converted the technology requirements of the Monitoring Agreement into a
universal form that can be referred to and used as a guide by others. The names of the taxpayers,
the third-party security provider, the POS/ECR manufacturer, and the government revenue
authority have been replaced with blanks and letters. The following appears, rather than the real
names:
• Taxpayer = the name of the individual or business involved;
• X = the name and model number of the POS system involved;
• Y = the manufacturer of the POS system;
• Z = the name of the third-party security system to be installed in X with the
permission of Y;
• State DOR = the name of the government revenue authority involved; and
• Citation to Statute = the applicable statutory provision granting authority to the State
DOR to audit the business records.
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Exhibit 1
ELECTRONIC MONITORING AGREEMENT
(Technical Requirements)
Between
_______(State)_______ DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE and
__________________________(Taxpayer)________________________________________

Hardware, Software and data requirements:
A. Point of Sale System: ______X______ POS system purchased from _____Y_____.
B. Electronic Monitoring Solution: _____Z____, a software-based security system,
integrated with the _____X_____ POS system, will be configured to securely store all
sales information on site, as well as transmit sales information to the __(State) ___ DOR.
1. Per___(citation to Statute) ______, all records must be open for inspection and
examination at any time by the department, upon reasonable notice, and must be
kept and preserved for a period of __(number)___ years.
C. The ____Z_____ security system will encrypt the database(s) in which its collected
information is stored, using one of the following industry standard symmetric encryption
algorithms such as:
1. AES,
2. Triple DES,
3. Blowfish or
4. Twofish.
D. In relation to the sales, _____(Taxpayer)______ will provide ____(State)_____ DOR.
1. Monthly sales reports generated from the ______X______ POS system and the
back end financial system (if any).
2. In addition to the monthly sales report, the monthly summary information will
include, detailed information collected by ____Z_____ secure monitoring system.
i. The information from ____Z______ will include:
1. Total Sales by day for month (Quantity and Amount)
2. Total Sales by Item (Quantity and Amount)
3. Total Discounts (Quantity and Amount)
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4. Net Sales
5. Total Tax
6. Total Amount Accounted For (grand total)
7. Tender/Payment Breakdown (Quantity and Amount)
8. Taxable Total
9. Number of voids (Quantity and Amount)
10. Number of open tills (Quantity)
11. Check Count/Average (Quantity and Average)
12. Guest Count/Average (Quantity and Average)
3. The raw data collected by ______Z_____ will be provided electronically to
____(State)_____DOR in the native format.
E. Method for Transmitting the Data Files:
1. The files will be sent decrypted electronically to a secured Secure File Transfer
(SFT) site provided by ____(State)____ DOR.
2. This data is due to ____(State)____ DOR no later than the 5th of each month
3. ____(State)____ DOR will provide a confirmation that the data was received no
later than the 20th of each month.
F. ______Z_____ will contain functionality to print QR / Bar codes on each receipt.
1.

The QR / Bar code data will contain:
i. Unique identifier code for each sale from_____Z____.
ii. Data from _____X_____ POS system includes at a minimum the
following fields: Date, Subtotal, tax amount, tendered total, payment
method

2. The QR / Bar code will be required on all original (completed sales) receipts.
3. The QR / Bar Code shall not be included on reprints and training mode sales
receipts.
4. Software for reading the QR / Bar Code will be provided to ____(State)____
DOR.
G. _____Z______ will record the times when systems are shut down and when they were
restarted whether or not these are caused by power outages or other triggers.
H. ____Y_____ will provide ____(State)____ DOR:
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1. User manual for the _______X______ POS system (in English and _____).
2. Outline of database structure for _____Z_____ system.
I. ____Y____ will provide ______(Taxpayer)______ with help-line assistance through
telephone, e-mail and optionally on-line chat. It will:
1. Provide assistance to ____(State)____ DOR when questions arise concerning the
operation of the system, when accessing data from the system, or data definitions
2. Provide assistance to _______(Taxpayer)_____ when notified of a software
update whenever such an update requires modifications to the ____Y_____
security installation.
J. ____Y_____ will provide a technician who will be available on-site for a two-day period
after full installation to demonstrate the system and train employees of the
______(Taxpayer)______ restaurant, and members of the ____(State)____ DOR (if
requested) in the operation of the system.
K. If the parties mutually agree that any additional information should be directly transferred
to ____(State)____ DOR, ______(Taxpayer)_____ and / or _____(Taxpayer’s
Representative)_______ will inform _____Y_____ of the additional data that should be
transferred. Every effort will be made by _____Y_____ to program ______Z______ for
updated compliance.
L. ____Y_____ will notify the ______(Taxpayer)_______ of any software updates needed
to the security system installed at the _______(Taxpayer) _______.
M. _____Y______ will test the POS system after security installation to assure:
1. Accuracy of records,
2. Encryption of sales data,
3. Ability of the ______Taxpayer_______ to deliver sales data to the
____(State)____ DOR on the schedule required.
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COMMENTARY
The technical requirements within the Monitoring Agreement are formally part of the
basic agreement between the Taxpayer and the WA DOR. Paragraphs A through M were
negotiated over a period of several months by the Taxpayer and the DOR.
Neither the POS manufacturer, nor the firm providing the software that does the
electronic monitoring are parties to the Monitoring Agreement, although the Taxpayer sought to
do so. Nevertheless, because these third-parties were making promises to the Taxpayer that will
be relied upon by both the Taxpayer and the DOR, it was deemed prudent to have them directly
involved in drafting, and reviewing the Monitoring Agreement.
Paragraphs A and B. The opening sections identify the POS system (X) and make it
clear that the POS system, manufactured by (Y), is independent of the software-based security
system (Z). The DOR specifically rejected using InfoSpec/Profitek as the POS provider (Y), as
did the Taxpayer.
Paragraph C. This paragraph promises that (Z) will apply “industry standard symmetric
encryption.” This is important because the provision is not time-limited. Industry standards in
the technology field are continually moving. This Monitoring Agreement endures for five years.
The Agreement permits flexibility to adjust the encryption methodology if necessary for the
protection of both the Taxpayer and the WA DOR.
Paragraph D. This paragraph makes the hybrid nature of the security system apparent.
D (1) expects that the POS system (X) will provide standard monthly sales reports. These
reports are expected to be delivered through software-based security system (Z).
D (2) moves directly to the additional data-elements that will be transmitted by the
software-based security system (Z). These data-elements are promised within the monthly
reports referenced at D (1), but can be produced in real-time to conform to a demand under the
statute reference at B(1).
The twelve data-elements promised exceed what is normally delivered by a top-of-theline POS system including time-measures of the “open till” as well as some standard audit
metrics Check Count/Average and Guest Count/Average. All of these measures can be provided
in various aggregates and real-time.
D (3) specifies that the transmission to the DOR will be electronically performed in
readable native format.
Paragraph E. Sets up the requirements for data transmission to the DOR with format
specified at E (1) and date of transmission at E (2), as well as an acknowledgement of receipt
requirement at E (3).
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Paragraph F. Assures the WA DOR of wide ranging functionality in (Z) to print QR/Bar
codes on each receipt issued F (1) with a unique identifier for each sale F (1) (i) and data
retrieved from the POS (X) related to that transaction including date, subtotal, tax amount, tender
total and payment method F (1) (ii).
This functionality has far ranging implications (and applications) if the WA DOR wants
to pursue development in this area. It is common in this field (although the State of Washington
did not seek full performance functionality during negotiations) for QR/ Bar code on a receipt to
provide the DOR with real-time data of high audit value.
For example, an individual could make a purchase at an establishment, and with the
receipt-in-hand be able to verify that the data for the purchase was secured by the POS (X),
encrypted by the secure element (Z), transmitted to the DOR and confirm everything in realtime. Related functionality would allow an inspector to sit in an establishment with an iPhone
application that would track in real-time the orders being processed as they were “rung up” on
the POS (X), as well as any of the standard audit metrics and more, also in real-time. Thus, it
would be possible to know that a cashier was operating with an open till in real-time, that is,
while the inspector is standing in the restaurant, perhaps talking with the manager. This kind of
functionality allows very brief, highly targeted real-time audits on location (where an auditor can
see the real-time activity behind the numbers) or remotely (where an auditor can perform a
reasonably comprehensive real-time audit from a distance).
Paragraph G. This paragraph requires (Z) to record power outages and system
downtimes, with in most instances an identification of the trigger event.
Paragraph H. Concerns the provision of user manuals and an outline of the database
structure that will be provided to the DOR by (Y).
Paragraph I. References the technology assistance that will be provided to both the
DOR and the Taxpayer from the technology provider.
Paragraph J. References the onsite training that will be provided to both the DOR and
the Taxpayer by the technology provider, including hands-on training with the actual system in
place.
Paragraph K. Is a good faith catch-all provision that records a promise by (Y) to provide
additional data capture, and transmission to all parties to the agreement upon notice of need.
Paragraph L. Contains a promise by (Y) to provide notification of system updates.
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Paragraph M. Contains a promise by (Y) to the Taxpayer to test the entire system for
accuracy, encryption, and transmission capabilities, that will be sufficient for the Taxpayer to
meet statutory obligations under this electronic monitoring agreement.
CONCLUSION
These requirements are the technology heart of this first-of-its-kind electronic monitoring
agreement for sales tax compliance in the US. It represents the end of a very long road for
technology-based solutions to Zappers, Phantomware and other sales suppression devices in the
US. Washington is taking a one-by-one, criminal enforcement approach to a very serious
systemic tax problem. Something far more comprehensive is needed, but this is a beginning.
The WADOR and other state taxing jurisdictions have long been aware of the problems
posed by Zappers and Phantomware. Over 10 years ago, Professor Ainsworth, one of the authors
of this article, recommended an approach similar to the present one, but instead of being used
under criminal statutes, it would be offered in the context of negotiating a settlement with
problematical taxpayers. The design would be to bring them back into compliance with a carrot
and a stick. The end result, but by a different path is the present Monitoring Agreement which
will likely be the prototype for such agreements in the future.
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